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Chapter 5 
Historical Approaches to Creativity and Innovation 
Simon Ville 
Introduction 
Historians have been interested in innovation per se but especially for its contribution 
to economic growth. This contribution has been widely interpreted through new 
processes and products but also new ways of organising economic and business 
activity. Historians have had less to say, however, about creativity than innovation. 
Interest has largely focussed upon the end result of creativity, that is, innovation. This 
is in large part because of the greater interest in the economic and social consequences 
of innovation than its origins. In addition, creativity is not easily substantiated through 
historical evidence since it is not so obviously outcome-based, or as easily 
documented, as innovation.  Nor has much been written about the reverse causality, 
that is, of innovation upon subsequent creativity. However, increased interest in recent 
years on the role of human capital in economic progress and the development of 
knowledge sectors has motivated closer historical consideration of the creative origins 
of innovation.  
 
In this chapter, I will analyse historical approaches to creativity and innovation. 
Initially, this will take the form of a broad international comparative perspective and 
then, more specifically, I will address recent Australian historical experience. This 
will include a focussed look at sources of new technology in the interwar period. In 
the final section of the paper, I will address briefly the policy implications arising 
from the historical survey. 
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Creativity, Innovation and the Economic Development of 
Nations 
 
Historians have laid emphasis on technological innovation as both a shorthand to 
describe different phases of economic development and as a causal factor in 
transitions between different epochs. One of the key drivers of a nation’s nature and 
pace of economic development is innovation, particularly through the development of 
cost-reducing processes, the introduction of new products and services, and the 
development of new ways or organising the activities of firms. 
 
The British ‘industrial revolution’ from the late eighteenth century was closely 
associated with the beginnings of a shift from a cottage system of outworkers using 
hand tools in cotton manufacture to the deployment of machine tools located in 
centralised factories (Hudson 2004). Thus, innovation was associated with both 
questions of spatial location and production technology. In addition, innovation was 
seen as the key to the explanation for this new industrial age: steam provided the 
wherewithal to power new machinery and, in turn, the railway system and steam 
shipping that created national and international markets for the products of the new 
manufacturing era. The chain effect of the new technology of steam rolled through the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century—steam’s use in railways and shipping 
motivated new advances in iron, steel, and engineering and with it a major stimulus to 
the European economies (Ville 1990).  
 
The late nineteenth century has been labelled a second industrial revolution—major 
advances in new, more scientifically-based industries, and in different countries, were 
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driving a new expansionary phase: German chemicals, electricity, and automobiles 
should particularly be noted (Pierenkemper and Tilly 2004). American firms carried 
these advances through into the twentieth century, particularly by extending German 
technology into organisational and marketing innovations. Automobiles were now 
mass produced on assembly lines, sold through specialist dealers offering hire 
purchase, all of this achieved under new governance structures associated with 
multidivisional organisations (Chandler 1966).   
 
Moving into the second half of the twentieth century, the types and location of 
innovation shifted once more and with it economic and industrial hegemony. From the 
1950s Japanese firms began to challenge those in Europe and North America 
particularly through holistic innovation in manufacturing systems, known as lean 
production, new approaches to labour management, and the development of 
imaginative forms of inter-firm transacting especially just-in-time contracting (Fruin 
1992).  
 
The diffusion and transfer of technology 
Besides playing a role in the economic development of individual nations, innovation 
provides us with a closer understanding of the interaction between the economic rise 
and decline of nations.  "Technological leapfrogging” is the ability of emerging 
economies to invest in the latest phase of innovations unencumbered by the sunk costs 
and interdependent requirements of older technologies. This process is made the more 
compelling where a command structure, normally that of government, provides the 
leadership for a poor, undeveloped economy to invest in innovation catch up as was 
the experience of late nineteenth-century Russia (Gerschenkron 1962).  It also 
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requires an effective method of technology transfer.  Historians have had much to say 
about the receptacles and obstacles to technology transfer.  David Jeremy, for 
example, identified the key role of skilled British migrant textile workers in the 
successful introduction and adaption of the cotton industry in nineteenth-century 
United States (Jeremy 1981). 
 
Related to leapfrogging and technology transfer is the need to distinguish between 
originators and users of new technology. Originating firms and nations are the first to 
absorb its economic benefits and have the trading opportunity to sell the innovation to 
others. However, recipient users, including late developing nations, avoid the costs of 
developing the technology and may gain more in terms of spanning developmental 
gaps from its widespread deployment.  Thus, based on a “social savings” calculation, 
some later developing European nations, such as Spain, appear to have gained more 
from their railway system than its technological originator, Britain (Ville 1990, 167) 
 
History confirms that the choice and duration of an innovation is often not optimal. 
Part of the explanation for this lies with human cognitive limits. It is also a function of 
the interconnections between technological systems as the leapfrogging hypothesis 
indicates.  History provides us with the opportunity to operationalise the concept of 
path dependency, wherein an initially favourable innovation may continue to operate 
beyond what is economically optimal. The example is often given of the QWERTY 
keyboard, designed to minimise key clashes on typewriters but still widely adopted 
for computer age keyboards (David 2000).  
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So far, our description of the sweep of history is suggestive of the role of so-called 
critical, heroic or “macro-inventions”, which deals with an essentially new 
technology, or a cluster of, that constitutes a radical break with the past and has the 
ability to usher in a phase of renewed economic progress (Mokyr 1990).  Where they 
also generated large positive externalities as a “general purpose technology” (Lipsey 
et al. 1998), their impact was substantial and wide-ranging, affecting both the pace of 
economic growth and the sources of leadership.  Examples of this are thought to 
include steam power in the mid nineteenth century, electricity from the end of that 
century, automobiles in the first half of the twentieth century, and information 
technology in the second half. Long run economic fluctuations, known as Kondratiev 
cycles, have been associated with macro-inventions, rising with the diffusion of each 
new breakthrough and tailing back thereafter. However, within each major historical 
phase of macro-invention lies many individual micro-inventions, which incrementally 
improve the original concept and often bring the technology to a “tipping point” 
whereat major economic breakthroughs are reached. To achieve sustained economic 
progress, Mokyr argues, an economy, or particular industry, must generate both macro 
and micro inventions. Thus, steam shipping finally dominated the major oceanic 
routes by the 1880s, after decades of incremental improvements to engine efficiency, 
with major implications for the efficiency of international trade and the emergence of 
the first phase of globalisation (O'Rourke & Williamson 1999). 
 
The institutional sources of creativity 
A modified view of innovation mutes the centrality of the macro-invention and its 
spreading effects achieved through externalities. Instead, “innovation is perceived as a 
broad process, pervasively embedded in many industries” (Bruland 2004, 146). Its 
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embracing nature is not the reverberation from a macro-invention but rather “a 
general social propensity to innovate” as Bruland (2004, 146) noted of eighteenth-
century Britain. This perspective provides us with a powerful link between creativity 
and innovation as general processes. North’s (1993, 16) idea of “mental models” 
describes society-wide belief systems that help individuals understand and interact 
with their environment.  Mental models evolve gradually over time, their constancy 
enabling us to make some generalisations about populations over longish periods of 
time. Thus, some nations may have been more “creative” than others at particular 
periods of history. If the industrial revolution was the creative awakening for Britain, 
then the Renaissance might have been the same for Italy, and the so-called “Golden 
Age” of the seventeenth century for the Netherlands.  While we tend to associate these 
particular phases of Italian and Dutch history with the creative visual arts, they were 
also times of significant practical innovations, note the construction of the Dutch 
system of canals and the innovative output of the Italian dockyards. 
 
The institutional sources of the creative spur behind the principal phases of innovation 
highlighted above have not gone unrecorded.  Creativity has variously been associated 
with major cultural and intellectual movements, types of educational institutions, the 
capabilities of firms themselves, and the facilitating role of government.  The so-
called Age of Reason and the “Enlightenment” of seventeenth-century and eighteenth-
century England, which were associated with a spirit of rational and critical enquiry 
into real world phenomena, has been widely viewed as an essential prerequisite to the 
subsequent “industrial revolution”.  This was seen as fostering an environment of 
individual observation, inventiveness, and the generation of “useful knowledge” as a 
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public good (Mokyr 2002), epitomised by Watt’s realisation of the practical 
implications of the expansiveness of steam in a boiling kettle.   
 
An emphasis upon more formal scientific and technical training in educational 
institutions provided a breeding ground for creativity and experimentation in German 
industry in the late nineteenth century (Arora, Landau and Rosenberg 1999).  
American firms of the early twentieth century such as General Electric and 
Westinghouse developed in-house research laboratories capable of developing a series 
of related technical advances in engineering and chemicals (Chandler 1990). Likewise 
Japanese firms contained notable research capabilities, but also drew upon 
government organisations and incentives to pursue innovation in fields such as steel 
and computing (Anchordoguy 1988). 
 
Behavioural patterns and social processes help to provide an understanding of how 
ideas are shaped.  Attitudes to individualism and uncertainty undoubtedly impact on 
the desire to experiment. Individualism expressed as a willingness to think and act 
differently from the mainstream will engender new ideas and approaches. A literature 
exists that associates de-familisation, the breakdown of large extended kinship ties, 
with the fostering of individualistic enterprise cultures, which includes a desire to 
innovate (Macfarlane 1978; 1987).  Inventiveness requires a degree of risk-taking 
given the likelihood of failure; it additionally represents a desire to mitigate sources of 
uncertainty through the introduction of needed innovations.  White (1992) and Ville 
(1998) have both argued for the importance of risk and uncertainty as an organising 
principle in the history of Australia.  A desire to mitigate environmental uncertainties 
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helped to shape business decisions and structures, and related to this is the fact that 
much creative thinking and innovative activity was designed to reduce uncertainty. 
 
Social capital and trust-based networks 
Sociologists, economists and, more recently, historians have begun to analyse the role 
of trust-based networks in sharing ideas and the flow of information relevant to 
innovation across organisational divides and geographic boundaries. At the core of 
this approach is the concept of social capital, which analyses the degree of interaction 
among individuals and between organisations who trust one another. Such 
information networks help to determine the extent, nature and direction of the flow of 
ideas although this is not always optimal since networks can have exclusive as well as 
inclusive implications (Maskell 2000; Ogilvie 2003).  Geographic contiguity among 
related industries can foster trust and generate reciprocating cycles of creativity and 
innovation as firms provide an innovation response to a perceived need which in turn 
motivates new creative opportunities; such is the Silicon Valley story (Lécuyer 2006). 
 
While social capital can help to bridge institutional and cultural divides, the concept 
of “communities of practice” explains how practitioners in the same field or industry 
can develop a mutually supportive social environment for the flourishing of new ideas 
(Wenger 1998).  The rise of scientific and engineering societies in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries brought together in a meeting place the demand for and supply of 
knowledge in the form of inventors and researchers, on the one hand, and firms that 
would adopt the emergent “useful knowledge” on the other.  Many such societies 
codified their knowledge in published proceedings; for example, from 1860 the 
Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects in Britain (Missing reference – not 
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required – is a general comment on this journal) published the latest developments in 
the rapidly advancing field of shipbuilding technology.  This interaction of inventor 
and user created reciprocal loops between creativity and innovation, as the former 
reacted to insights gleaned from the perspectives and needs of the latter.  
 
The accumulation of large stocks of social capital in Britain by the eighteenth century 
has been viewed as an important prerequisite for subsequent rapid economic growth 
(Szereter 2000).  British migrants are believed to have transported their social capital 
tradition with them to the United States and other settler nations including Australia 
(Greene 2001). Such a view is consistent with Laird’s recent thesis that successful 
entrepreneurs in nineteenth-century United States owed much to their social capital 
connections (Laird 2006).  Godley’s study of Jewish immigrant entrepreneurship in 
New York and London, 1880-1914 (Godley, 2001 – Missing reference from 
Reference list – IS in references), illustrates the role of trust-based networks carried 
across geographic boundaries to the process of creativity and innovation. Moreover, 
from a comparative perspective, it confirms the significance of particular national and 
cultural environments as Jewish migrants in the United States behaved more 
entrepreneurially than their otherwise identical counterparts in the United Kingdom.   
His work forms part of a longer and broader historiography focussing on the cultural 
determinants of economic development, which includes Weiner’s (1981) classic study 
of the development of an anti-business culture in Britain from the late nineteenth 
century 
 
Our examples of the economic impact of displaced groups are replicated through 
history, and their significance for creativity and innovation are heightened when they 
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bring with them complementary stocks of human capital. Indeed, migrants have often 
been highly talented bringing with them knowledge and creativity across many areas 
of the economy and the arts. In such cases, it is often governmental intolerance of 
diversity and heterodoxy that has driven out creative sectors of society to the 
detriment of the domestic economy. Mokyr (2005) has used this insight to trace 
increased toleration of heterodox ideas by European governments in the three 
centuries after 1450.  Analysing 1185 scientists, he estimates a decline in mobility 
levels, despite improved transport facilities, as European states, competing for 
economic advancement, embraced their heterodox creative thinkers. 
 
Governments can go beyond benign tolerance to a more active encouragement of 
creativity, particularly through mitigating many of the potential sources of market 
failure. Khan and Sokoloff (2004) have shown how the design of smart patent law in 
nineteenth-century United States made it easier for less wealthy and well-connected 
individuals to become inventors than was the case in Europe. Well-defined property 
rights, the enforcement of patent law, and the ability to raise finance through the 
collateral of a patent were all key features of the American patent system. The effect 
therefore was to foster creative activity more broadly throughout society. 
 
Therefore, understanding the role played by particular institutions, such as social 
networks, government policy, and educational and research organisations, and the 
form of accepted behaviour (norms) between them and among individuals provides 
the institutional framework in which innovation has occurred. This ”innovation 
systems” approach has been widely conceptualised and analysed in the contemporary 
innovation literature but has received little attention from historians (Nelson and 
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Winter 1993; Edquist and McKelvey 2000). History, nonetheless, provides the setting 
for analysing the evolution of distinctive innovation systems, that is, a combination of 
elements of continuity – key patterns –  moderated by historical experience and 
change. Such patterns or layers, by setting some distinctive ground rules, have helped 
to give shape and coherence to a multi-layered national framework for innovation at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century.  
 
Innovation in Resource-Based Economies: the Australian 
Experience 
 
Domestic innovation and its creative spur has been focussed on resource-based 
industries throughout Australian history because of their key role in the economy, 
both as a share of output, but particularly their dominance of exports. The share of 
resources production (agricultural, pastoral and mining) in GDP fluctuated around 25-
35 per cent from the mid nineteenth century until the 1920s, thereafter declining 
gradually to around 15 per cent by the 1980s (Healliwell 1984, 88). The share of 
resources in exports fluctuated around 40 to 70 per cent (Pinkstone 1992).  Staple 
theory, which emphasises the stimuli accorded economic modernisation through 
staple commodity exports, has been widely analysed and discussed in Australian 
historiography  (Pomfret 1981; Fogarty 1985).  The advisability of development 
centred on resource industries has been debated for at least half a century. It has been 
argued that resource-based development is destined to fail since the “windfall” 
associated with resource abundance has brought in its wake cognitive, societal, policy, 
and economic constraints on development. In the 1990s Sachs and Warner (1995) 
formalised this perspective into the “resource curse” hypothesis.  Recent work has 
provided something of a counterbalance by indicating that the curse is not inevitable 
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and by investigating what resource-based economies can do to mitigate it (Ross 1999; 
de Ferranti et al. 2002). 
 
Nations such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden testify to the 
possibilities for successful resource-based development.  One element of the debate is 
whether resource-based development represents a focus on industries with a low 
technological capability. As a consequence, this may have contributed to a loss of 
relative international ranking of GDP per capita over the twentieth century as 
Australia and similar nations missed out on high growth industries stimulated by rapid 
technical progress such as automobiles, aviation, complex chemicals, and information 
technology. Such a view is also consistent with a broader academic and popular 
debate as to whether manufacturing industries should be the principal foundations of 
any modern economy.  As such, the following research questions might be addressed. 
Are we correct to view primary industries as a low innovation sector?  Does resource-
based development restrain a nation from participating in the rapid change and 
sequential phases of new technology of the manufacturing and services sectors? Has 
this form of development created a heavy reliance upon imported technology at the 
expense of a domestic innovation system? We will address each of these questions in 
turn. 
 
Innovation in the primary industries 
Resource-based industries are highly dependent upon the nature and vicissitudes of 
climate, geology, and geography, each of which are highly spatially contingent, often 
requiring a different response across nations or even sub-national regions.  
Technology provides a means of moderating, these influences.  
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The natural environment that primary industries have faced in Australia has few 
parallels in other regions of the world, necessitating domestic solutions to many 
production problems.  Drought, poor soil quality and pestilence emphasised the 
vulnerability of farming to output vicissitudes that have been marked even for such a 
highly unpredictable sector. Early innovations in the farming sector, therefore, 
focused on overcoming development obstacles and mitigating cyclical instability. 
These included the jump stump plough, drought and disease tolerant wheats, 
fertilisers, merino sheep breeding, dams, artesian wells, wire fencing and nets (Raby 
1996).  Moreover, regional differences in the environment have been marked, farming 
processes and products varying, for example, between temperate coastal areas, inland 
arid locations, and sub-tropical regions.  In mining, Australia by the late nineteenth 
century began to play a key international role as one of the major extractors of mineral 
deposits and one of the principal sources of technical change.  In contrast to the 
proliferation of small scale operations in Australian farming, mining soon became 
concentrated in the hands of the leading corporate players who had the resources and 
motivation to drive innovation. BHP, in particular, has used its technological know-
how as a competitive advantage in becoming a resource-seeking multinational, for 
example in the operation of coal mines in New Mexico, a large copper mine in Chile, 
and a diamond mine in Canada.  
 
Participation in new manufacturing innovation 
While Australia has not been a key figure in most of the new high-tech industries of 
the twentieth century, she has shared in many of the benefits they have brought to 
producers and consumers.  Australians, for example, have been heavy users of air 
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transport and information technology products for both work and leisure.  This has 
particularly included the primary industries—aviation, for example, has facilitated 
crop spraying, ore prospecting, and more generally facilitated communication with 
remote mining and pastoral settlements. More recently, information technology has 
improved operational efficiency such as through optimal crop watering and the 
development of electronic auction sales.  Australians, in general, have been amongst 
the largest users, per capita, of information technology products. As such, they have 
shared in its benefits which, particularly over the last decade, have favoured users 
more than producers due to enormous improvements in efficiency and substantial 
reductions in price. In particular, information technology has facilitated major 
productivity improvements in the wholesale and retail trades, construction, and 
finance (Gordon 2000).   
 
Australia has participated in high tech industries where tradeability has been limited 
by the physical cost of importing or the specific needs of the local market, or where 
government policy has provided subsidies, tariffs or other forms of support to foster a 
local industry.  A classic example has been the automobile industry where a series of 
tariff and exchange incentives facilitated the first entirely Australian-built vehicle in 
1948 (Conlon & Perkins 2001, 115-16). 
 
Vertical integration and product diversification by major Australian resource 
companies have provided opportunities to embrace manufacturing innovation. 
Capabilities initially established in resource industries were often extended forward 
into processing and, ultimately, final good production. CSR and BHP are both notable 
examples of this.  CSR’s early success in the nineteenth century rested on being the 
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first company to install technologically-advanced sugar refining plants on a scale that 
dramatically lowered costs.  By the 1930s, its research laboratories, supported by 
foreign licences, visits to overseas plants, and international joint ventures, led the firm 
to new downstream products, particularly in the alcohol and chemicals industries. 
After World War Two, related diversification into building materials became the 
company’s focus including the production of vinyl flooring (1949), insulation and 
hardboard (1959), particle board (1960), and pre-mixed concrete (1965) (Hutchinson 
2001, 109-10). Technical efficiency became the company’s watchword.  BHP 
vertically integrated forwards from mining to become the steel industry leader with 
major plants in Newcastle (1915) and Port Kembla (1935). Subsequently, it 
diversified into a range of related downstream products, which included steel alloys, 
hot water systems, and tools. Significantly, both companies have now leveraged their 
technical leadership overseas, CSR in the American building materials industry 
through Rinker, and BHP-Billiton, now separated from its steel-making capability 
(Bluescope), in many overseas resource industries as noted earlier. 
 
Imported technology or a domestic innovation system? 
International technology transfer has been a key part of the innovation process in 
Australia, particularly outside the resource-based industries.  This has occurred 
through a variety of channels. Many modern manufacturing industries in Australia are 
dominated by foreign multinationals, who have imported innovations as part of their 
process of establishment and operation. On other occasions, technology has been 
transferred as part of a joint venture between a local and a foreign firm.  It has been 
estimated that 83 per cent of the firms responsible for major innovations between 
1939 and 1953 had overseas affiliations, while 80 per cent of payments by Australian 
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firms for technical know-how in 1988-9 went to related foreign enterprises (Hocking 
1958, 28-9; Bureau of Industry Economics 1993, 122).   
 
It might be inferred from such a heavy reliance upon foreign technology that Australia 
has lacked a domestic or national innovation system, with most local inventiveness 
being restricted to some specific, largely primary, industries.  Freeman defines a 
national innovation system as: “the network of institutions in the public and private 
sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse new 
technologies” (Freeman 1987, 10).  Thus, innovativeness includes activities 
associated with imported technologies. Perhaps most significant is the modification 
and adaption of foreign technologies to suit local needs, a process requiring 
significant creative and inventive energy. A sample of firms in the 1970s revealed that 
42 per cent of their research budget was spent on modifying foreign technology (Parry 
& Watson 1979, 107-9). 
 
Gregory identified four distinctive features of the Australian innovation system, each 
of which has an ongoing historical resonance: low science and technology 
expenditure, low private R & D, high government financing and participation in 
research, and high dependence on foreign technology. Consistent with its role in many 
aspects of the Australian economy, government has served as a major provider of 
finance and of research organisations. Much of this support has been oriented to the 
rural sector in recognition of the market failure problems associated with a 
proliferation of small producers for much of our history.  Moreover, it represents a 
response to unique environmental challenges and the realisation that most of the 
benefits will be captured locally in commodity markets dominated by Australia 
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(Gregory 1993, 325-9).  The CSIRO and its predecessor CSIR is a major public sector 
research organisation oriented to the needs of resource industries (Schedvin 1987). 
Other aspects of a national innovation system that might be emphasised a little more 
include the role of educational institutions, both vocationally oriented such as Schools 
of Mines [why was this highlighted?]  and agricultural colleges, and more broadly 
based universities as providers of pure and applied research.  Agricultural and pastoral 
societies are a reminder of the role of social and community movements in 
innovation.  Stock and station agents have provided a key network node connecting 
farmers with a wider business and research community (Ville, 2000, 153-61).  Finally, 
the contribution of domestic corporations has perhaps been understated in place of 
global companies. Local firms have played a role in negotiating joint ventures with 
overseas firms, seeking out other sources of knowledge, and honing their adaptive 
capabilities.   
 
 
Research Focus: The Technological Drivers of Structural 
Change in Interwar Australia
i
  
 
“…in 1914 (Australia) could barely arm its expeditionary forces with rifles, is today 
able to manufacture locally a sufficient quantity of the most modern and complicated 
weapons from warships to guns” (Australian Investment Digest, April 15, 1940, p. 
148). 
 
It has long been assumed that tariff policy drove structural change in the interwar 
Australian economy from rural industries towards manufacturing by providing price 
protection for infant or inefficient industries (Benham 1928; Anderson & Garnaut 
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1987).  Investment shifts in favour of manufacturing, however, may have owed more 
to exogenous changes in process and product technology than to the impact of public 
policy. Thomas (1988, 271) has argued that “Australia’s continued march towards 
industrialisation was based not on artificial inducements to produce manufactures, but 
on lower costs, underwritten by increased efficiency and productivity”.  
Manufacturing not only expanded in sise, its technological base and what it produced 
changed dramatically. Technology, largely imported from abroad, was the catalyst for 
change by creating new products and reconfiguring cost functions. Its adaptation, 
industry by industry across the 1920s and 1930s, has been mapped by Mauldon 
(1938) who shows that there were marked differences in the rate of what he describes 
as mechanisation between industries and across time.   
 
The key to this pattern of technological change was the emergence of two new general 
purpose technologies, electricity and the automobile. Their impact was substantial and 
wide-ranging. Demand for both products increased rapidly from low starting points 
during the interwar period.  These technologies transformed many aspects of both 
consumption and production. Electricity provided the technological base for a wide 
range of new and improved consumer durables. Automobiles constituted a major new 
durable in themselves, which, like the many electrical household products, heralded 
major and exciting changes in personal lifestyles. On the production side, the 
flexibility, controllability, divisibility, and speed of electrical power provided many 
productivity-enhancing opportunities, particularly through the spread of electric 
motors.  Automobile production created the demand directly for many new related 
industries such as petrol refining, the manufacture and repair of a wide range of 
vehicle parts, and the construction of roads and parking stations. Motor vehicles 
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increased factor mobility across many industries, especially through improved access 
to raw materials and better commuting opportunities for workers in labour-intensive 
manufacturing.   
 
In both cases, therefore, these new technologies created a clustering of new industries 
around them, but also provided productivity improvements in many older and 
unrelated sectors. Finally, note should also be made of the impact of these 
technological breakthroughs on the service sector including public transport (trains, 
trams, buses, and taxis), distribution systems (road vehicle transport), retail (store 
organisation and presentation), finance (vehicle hire purchase), and leisure (moving 
pictures), holiday accommodation, and recorded music), which in turn fed back into 
further demand for manufacturing products. 
 
A recently-constructed database of most new capital issues in this period reveals the 
acquisition and adaptation of foreign patents by innovative-minded domestic firms to 
be a central part of this process of industrial transformation. The capital issues 
information, extracted from the Australian Investment Digest, contains evidence of 
2176 new issues across the interwar period and, when compared with stock exchange 
data for increased company capitalisation, it appears to have captured most new 
issues.  The aggregate trend for the number of new capital issues and the amount 
raised over the interwar period describes a pronounced cycle similar to other 
measurements of economic fluctuations in Australia. There was a steady rise of 
capital issues until the onset of the Depression around 1929 when their numbers fell 
sharply, followed by a recovery from the mid 1930s.  The distribution of new issues, 
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either by number or value, across the major economic sectors confirms the 
conventional wisdom, that resources were being shifted into manufacturing. 
 
The question of investment motivation is aided by information on the reason for the 
capital issue, which has been coded into some standard explanations. Interestingly, 
more than half (58 per cent) of the value of new issues in manufacturing was derived 
from new companies.  Twenty-five per cent of new issues were by new companies 
seeking to purchase the rights to manufacture and/or sell another company’s products. 
This was predominantly about acquiring a patent from the inventor or seeking to 
replicate domestically the success of a product in a foreign market. This was the 
largest individual motivator and, in the case of new companies, accounted for almost 
half of the investment decisions. The subdivisions where this purpose was most 
significant were transport equipment manufacturing, accounting for 52 per cent of its 
issues, followed by petroleum and coal product manufacturing and polymer product 
and rubber product manufacturing (each 50 per cent), then machinery and equipment 
manufacturing (45 per cent). These were the new
 
technology industries of the period 
most closely associated with electricity and the automobile.  Sixty per cent of issues 
with this purpose (seeking to purchase the rights to manufacture and/or sell another 
company’s goods or services) were directly related to the technologies of electricity or 
vehicle production.     
 
The figure of 25 per cent understates the significance of innovation since a further 12 
per cent of new issues were merely declared as start up capital for a new company, 
and a further 18 per cent as expansion or improvement capital for an existing 
company. A further 20 per cent of all new issues by existing companies did not state a 
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reason, secretiveness doubtless playing a role for some innovating enterprises. Despite 
the lack of detailed explanation for most existing companies, we expect many 
purchased new technology through licences and patents and paid for other companies’ 
brands. Thus, an extreme interpretation is that as much as 75 per cent of new capital 
issues in manufacturing were motivated by a desire to innovate. If innovation is 
interpreted in the broader sense to include organisational restructuring, the proportion 
rises above 80 per cent. 
 
The expansion of existing companies was common in more mature industries such as 
food products, beverage and tobacco products; textiles, leather, clothing and footwear; 
and primary metal and metal products. Even in these mature industries, however, 
there were a notable number of new firms. In food products, possessing one of the 
largest shares of capital issues, more than a quarter of issues were made by new 
companies seeking to purchase rights to another company’s goods or services (16 per 
cent ) or seeking start-up capital (13 per cent ). 
 
While this research throws light on the role of innovation in structural change, we 
have yet to discover the origins of the creative spur behind this outpouring of 
innovation and adaptation. The opportunities provided by the new general purpose 
technologies undoubtedly motivated a response in Australia as in many other nations. 
However, the wide range of innovation across industries and firms old and new is 
suggestive of a broader propensity to innovate, which goes beyond mere imitation of 
overseas innovation. Australia went through a structural shift from primary to 
secondary industries that contrasted with the old to new manufacturing industry shift 
in many other smaller advanced nations in Europe that were importing American and 
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British technology. If Australia’s experience was quite different and more marked 
than most nations, historical landmarks may play a role particularly the significance of 
Federation, World War One, and the broadening of trade routes and migration 
patterns in creating an Australia that was more independent and confident of its 
position in the world and was developing a much wider range of international ties and 
associations. Put another way, it may well prove to be the case that rapid institutional 
changes in early twentieth-century Australia lay behind a notably innovative phase of 
economic development. Comparisons with New Zealand, a resource-based economy 
that experienced more muted institutional change but also less sectoral diversification, 
may be instructive. 
 
Implications for Policy 
What policy implications, if any, may be drawn from our historical survey of 
creativity and innovation?  
 
Innovation has come in many forms (product, process, organisational) and is clearly a 
major driver of phases of transformational economic change and changing industrial 
leadership among nations.  The questions that arise from this statement are pertinent 
for future policy. In particular, how do nations make the most of the flow-on benefits 
from phases of innovation—making the right choices among technological 
alternatives, maximising the positive externalities, and optimising its duration.  
 
A range of considerations may influence the choice of technologies at any one time,  
should the focus be on a nation’s areas of comparative advantage or embrace the 
opportunities for diversification presented by innovation. Australia’s approach has 
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manifested various options—strong continued emphasis upon comparative advantages 
in resource
_
based industries, but diversification into manufacturing in the interwar 
period by adaptation of foreign technologies. 
 
History confirms that general purpose technologies have a powerful transformational 
role although the principal beneficiaries are not always obvious—continental 
European gains from the railways and Australian gains from electricity and the 
automobile.  In most of the high growth innovative industries of the twentieth century 
Australia has been an adapter and user of technologies developed overseas. As we 
have seen with ICT over the last fifteen years, there are many benefits from being a 
user nation. What is critical, however, is the ability to envisage the potential role and 
application of foreign
_
derived technologies, the facilitation of its transfer and 
adaptation, and the establishment of incentives for its domestic pervasion.     
 
Finally, optimal duration is about acknowledging that macro
 
innovations are followed 
by many years of incremental micro
 
inventions that transform the efficiency and 
impact of the original innovation. The ability to gain leadership at the incremental 
stages can have wide-ranging implications, note for example the success of Japanese 
computer companies following initial leadership by American firms. However, 
duration is also about regime change—why do problems of path dependency emerge 
and how does regime change occur among nations and industries? While there has 
been an historical focus on explaining the rise of British, American and Japanese 
manufacturing, equally valuable would be to understand more about the leaders’ fall 
from grace.  
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Australia presents particular innovation challenges—as a small nation with a 
comparative advantage in resource-based industries. We suggested earlier that 
institutional structure is more important than industrial location for a nation. Nor is 
smallness necessarily a barrier to innovative activity. If innovation leadership remains 
a possibility, there are two approaches worth pursuing in light of recent historical 
trends. In the second half of the twentieth century, Australia’s population and 
domestic market grew rapidly. Yet, in many cases, scale economies accelerated more 
rapidly, meaning the opportunity to compete in many major industries diminished 
(Forster 1970). However, the raft of changes associated with globalisation and 
deregulation has enabled smaller economies to compete with increasing effectiveness 
at the sub-industry level as international specialisation within global industries 
expands.  There is growing evidence to suggest that while manufacturing’s share of 
Australian GDP has been contracting recently, that output is increasingly efficient, 
competitive and innovative (Anderson 2001, Table 13.4).  
 
A much more recent development is the growing global concern for more efficient 
management of our natural resources for fear of the consequences of depletion and 
pollution. This throws the emphasis back upon innovation in resource-based industries 
and the opportunity for nations like Australia to leverage their expertise here. Recent 
developments in geosequestration technology is an example of this.  History teaches 
us that resource-based economies can be highly successful and innovative and that it 
is the broader question of institutional framework that determines performance not the 
sectoral emphasis of production.  As Blainey (2006, 11) noted in a recent survey of 
the history of Australian innovation, “The history of agriculture in the last 150 years is 
the history of innovation.”  
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If many nations have experienced periods of creative awakening, what can 
governments do to foster a creative society and economy and to translate a sense of 
creativity into Mokyr’s “useful knowledge” (Mokyr, 2002). Valuing creativity and 
heterodox thinking is a message that emanates clearly from the historical literature. 
Investment in human capital may be one response but the solution is also about the 
learning system itself and how we learn. Tolerating unorthodoxy, pure undirected 
research, and accepting that many areas of creative thinking and research will not 
produce any tangible outcome are part of the story. So too is fostering a strong sense 
of trust, cooperation and sharing as reflected in the concept of social capital. The 
treatment of science as a public good and the interaction of scientific researchers and 
practitioners in eighteenth
_
century Britain provides lessons for the twenty-first-
century policy makers grappling with the significance of open source technologies 
and community-style websites as receptacles for shared learning.  
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 This section is taken from joint research work with Professor David Merrett with the 
assistance of Mr Andrew Parnell under ARC Discovery Project 0557412 ‘Business 
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